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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Plaintiff - Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 89-697-CA

MICHAEL L. PICKENS,

Category No. 2

Defendant - Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This appeal arises from Defendant's conviction for Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2A-3(2)(d) which permits appeals from circuit courts.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly
found sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES OR RULES
The only statute involved in this appeal is Section 416-44, Utah State Code Anno., as adopted by Ordinance No. 83-14,
City of Park city, Utah, which provides:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person to operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person has
a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 5, 1989, Defendant was charged with Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol and Driving on a Suspended License, both
Class B Misdemeanors,

(R. 3, 4). On May 5, 1989, the Defendant

filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress the blood test
results.

(R. 5, 11). Hearings on these Motions were held on May

24, 1989 in the Circuit Court in and for Park City, Summit
County, the Honorable Maurice D. Jones, presiding (Circuit Court
Docket found in record after page 47).

Both Motions were

eventually denied by Judge Jones.
A bench trial was heard on July 5, 1989. At the conclusion
of the evidence, the trial court took the case under advisement.
(Circuit Court Docket found in records after page 47) .
On August 16, 1989, the Court found the Defendant guilty of
the offense of During Under the Influence of Alcohol.

On

November 20, 1989, the defendant was sentenced which sentenced is
stayed pending this appeal.

(Circuit Court Docket found in

record after page 47).
On November 16, 1989, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
An Amended Notice of Appeal was then filed on December 6, 1989.
(R. 31, 45). This court dismissed the appeal inasmuch as no
written judgment had been entered by the Circuit Court.

A formal

Judgment Conviction was executed by Circuit Court Judge, Maurice
D. Jones, which was filed in the Third Circuit Court, Park City
Department, on August 10, 1990. A new Notice of Appeal was then
filed by Defendant on August 24, 1990.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 29, 1989, at approximately 9:45 p.m. on Highway
224 in Park City, Utah, the Defendant drove his Nissan pick-up
truck into the rear of a Park City Municipal Corporation road
grader.

(R. 6,7 & 17). At the time of the accident the road

grader was traveling at approximately 15 miles per hour to the
Ridgeview Subdivision to remove snow.

(R. 6, 7). The accident

occurred when the Nissan pick-up driven by the Defendant passed a
Park City Municipal Corporation loader and rammed into the rear
of the road grader which was approximately four car lengths to
100 yards in front of the loader.

(R. 18, 21 22). The grader

had its rear lights activated and Highway 224 was bare of snow
when the accident occurred.

(R. 6, 18).

After the accident occurred the driver of the grader, LaMar
Simpson, went to Defendant's vehicle where he determined
Defendant was bleeding from the nose and had injured his leg.
(R. 9, 18). Mr. Simpson advised the investigating Officer,
Robert Caffery, that he detected alcohol and requested that a
blood alcohol sample be drawn from Defendant for detection of
alcohol.

(R. 9).

Officer Caffery also detected the odor of alcohol coming
from inside the pick-up truck where the Defendant was pinned.
(R. 28, 29).
The Defendant was removed from his vehicle and taken to the
Holy Cross Clinic in Park City, Utah.
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(R. 29). At the Holy

Cross Hospital, Officer Caffery advised Defendant that he was
investigating a DUI and asked if he would voluntarily consent to
have his blood drawn.

(R. 30). After speaking with his

attorney, Loni DeLand, the defendant agreed to submit to a blood
test.

(R. 32) .

The blood was drawn by Margie Offert at the

Holy Cross Clinic and placed in a blood collection kit.

(R. 32) .

Mr. Caffery deposited the blood collection kit in evidence at the
Park City Police Department on January 30, 1990.

Officer Mary

Ford of the Park City Police Department took the sealed blood
collection kit to the Utah State Health Lab on January 30, 1990.
(R. 46, 47). Barbara Jepson from the State Health Lab did not
testify based on a stipulation of defense counsel that her
toxicology report would be admitted into evidence subject to
relevance, materiality and foundation.

(R. 49, 50) . Although

counsel for both parties argued whether the foundation
requirements were met for introduction of Exhibit No. 3, the
Court on two separate occasions indicated the toxicology report
would be received.

(R. 49, 53). The toxicology report showed a

.17 alcohol blood reading.

(R. 54).

Officer Caffery testified that Defendant admitted he had
been drinking alcohol and the officer was of the opinion the
Defendant was intoxicated.

(R. 29, 34). No field sobriety tests

were performed due to the extent of the injuries sustained by the
Defendant.

(R. 34).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The prosecution has proven each element of the crime of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol by showing both: (1) the
defendant had a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater, and (2)
the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a
degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving his vehicle
even without considering the blood test.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A CONVICTION FOR DUI
To convict the Defendant of Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol, it is required that the prosecution prove the following
elements:
1. That on or about the 29th day of January, 1989, the
Defendant, Michael L. Pickens, was driving a motor vehicle.
2. That while so driving the motor vehicle, the defendant
either:
(a) Was under the influence of alcohol to a degree
which rendered said defendant incapable of driving
said vehicle; OR
(b) The defendant had a blood alcohol content
of .08% or greater;
3. That such alleged acts occurred in Park City, Summit
County, State of Utah.
There is no dispute that elements number 1 and 3 have been
proven by the prosecution.

Accordingly, the issue in this case

is whether the Defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
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liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving
his vehicle or whether the Defendant had a blood alcohol content
of .08 percent or greater.
It is submitted that with the docket entry reflecting that
the court admitted the blood kit and sealed container and the
court transcript reflecting such admission on two separate
occasions is sufficient evidence to show that element 2(b) above
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
However, even if this court does not find that the .17 blood
alcohol test was received into evidence, there is sufficient
evidence to establish the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt without considering the blood test result.
Defendant has cited in his Memorandum State v. Goodman, 91
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, September 9, 1988, to establish the standard of
review in an appeal from a bench trial.

The standard of review

in criminal cases was also set forth in the case of In Interest
of I.. R.L.. 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987) which also involved a
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol case which was tried
before the trial judge as the trier fact.

Citing State v.

Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444-45, the Court stated:
We review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed,
is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted (citations omitted)....This Court still has
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to
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support the verdict. The fabric of evidence against the
defendant must cover the gap between the presumption of
innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of its
duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence,
stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
739 P.2d at 1129.
The I.R.L. case is closely analogous to the case at bar
inasmuch as the issue was whether there was sufficient evidence
to sustain a conviction for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol.

In the I., R.L. case, the Utah Court of Appeals

suppressed the blood test on the basis there was no "actual
consent" to the blood test that was performed prior to the
defendant's arrest.

Accordingly, the Court had to determine if

the following facts were sufficient to sustain the defendant's
conviction without considering the blood test:

(1) A serious

head-on collision with testimony the defendant had been driving
in the wrong way of traffic on a blind curve;

(2)

The strong

alcoholic odor at the scene of the accident and later at the
hospital;

(3) Voluntary, unsolicited statements from the

defendant such as "I am drunk.
out and shoot me.";

I am guilty.

They should take me

(4) At times the defendant talking

incoherently in a rambling manner and "screamed and hollered";
(5)

The opinion of the investigating officer that the
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defendant was under the influence of intoxicants.

The defendant,

as in a case at bar, did not present any evidence at trial.

The

Court, after considering the above factors stated:
We find from reviewing the evidence that reasonable minds
could not entertain a reasonable doubt that the appellant
committed the crime for which he was convicted and that the
evidentiary fabric need not even be stretched to come to
this conclusion. We therefore find, even excluding the
blood test, that there is sufficient evidence to sustain
appellant's conviction in the juvenile court and that
the blood test evidence was only cumulative. 739 P.2d at
1129.
Reviewing the evidence in the case at bar, the factors
establishing guilt are almost identical:

(1)

The defendant was

involved in a serious automobile accident with testimony that the
defendant drove into the back of a Park City road grader which
was traveling on a highway bare of snow with its rear lights
activated; (2) Admissions by the defendant that he had been
drinking cilcohol;

(3) The odor of an alcoholic beverage as

testified to by both the driver of the road grader and the
investigating officer; and

(4) Testimony of the investigating

officer that the defendant was intoxicated.
Appellant cites Sandy City v. Thorsness, 115 Utah Adv. Rep.
28, August 18, 1989, as a case where a DUI conviction was
reversed by this court where the officer's suspicion for the stop
was based on a driving pattern which was "equally indicative of
innocent behavior".

The Thorsness case is easily distinguished

from the case at bar.

The sole issue in Thorsness was whether
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there was probably cause to stop the vehicle driven by defendant.
The officer in Thorsness had stopped to assist a motorist at 1:30
a.m.

The defendant drove around the officer's vehicle and

stopped his car to observe the activity of the officer and the
car's occupant.
speed".

The driver then pulled away at a "slow rate of

Based solely on these factors, the officer activated his

emergency lights and pulled the defendant to the side of the
road.

Under these facts, the court properly indicated that there

was no reasonable basis to suspect the defendant of being
intoxicated when he stopped his vehicle.

Although the

defendant's conviction was reversed, this Court expressed its
concern about the dangers posed by those driving while
intoxicated.

The Court stated:

We are sensitive to the dangers posed in our communities
by those who drive while intoxicated. See State v.
Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985), and cases cited
therein. But, even so, these dangers are not properly
alleviated by permitting traffic stops and arrests on the
basis of evidence as meager as that offered in this
case. Our decision should not deter the enforcement of
drunk driving laws when traffic stops and arrests are
predicated on at least a reasonable, articulated suspicion
that an accused is intoxicated. 115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29.
Appellant also cites State v. Johnson, 287 P.
909 (Utah 1930).

This case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch

as it dealt with the crime of involuntary manslaughter as it
existed sixty years ago.

One of the issues in the case was

whether the defendant was operating his vehicle under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
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The only evidence in this

regard was testimony that three or four hours after the accident,
the chief of police called at the defendant's residence and
detected the odor of liquor on defendant's breath.

The defendant

testified that he had not drank any liquor on the date in
question and witnesses who saw and conversed with the defendant
shortly before and after the accident testified he was not under
the influence of alcohol.

The facts of Johnson are

distinguishable from facts in the instant case where defendant
was involved in an auto accident consistent with a driver being
under the influence of alcohol; the odor of alcohol was smelled
on the Defendant's breath or from defendant's vehicle while he
was pinned in his vehicle by two individuals at the scene of the
accident; the Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol; and the
investigating officer was of the opinion that Defendant was
intoxicated.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and arguments, this Court
should uphold the decision of the trial judge finding the
Defendant guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 1990.

Terry \L. Christiansen
Parkjdity Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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Loni F. DeLand, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 132 South 600
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, on this 29th day of October,
1990.
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